More Details Emerge on Military Cooking Intelligence for Obama
This article appeared on the Executive Intelligence Review website and is copied here with permission.
Sept. 10, 2015 (EIRNS)—As previously reported here, the August 25 New York Times reported that the Department of Defense Inspector General had launched an investigation into whether military intelligence assessments of the effectiveness of the U.S.-led campaign against the Islamic State in Iraq are over-optimistic, and specifically whether officials of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)
"were improperly reworking the conclusions of intelligence assessments prepared for policy makers, including President Obama."
The Daily Beast today provided more information about the IG’s investigation, reporting that two intelligence analysts at CENTCOM filed a formal written complaint to the IG in July, supported by more than 50 others who were prepared to back up the allegations from their own experiences. The analysts (some of whom had complained within CENTCOM for several months about politicizing intelligence reports) alleged that
"the reports, some of which were briefed to President Obama, portrayed the terror groups as weaker than the analysts believe they are. The reports were said to have been changed by CENTCOM higher-ups to adhere to the administration’s public line that the U.S. is winning the battle against ISIS and al Nusra, al Qaeda’s branch in Syria, the analysts claim."
A Defense official was quoted saying, "The cancer was within the senior level of the intelligence command." Among those accused are the CENTCOM director of intelligence and his deputy. The article reported that some of the complaining analysts are employed by the Defense Intelligence Agency, assigned to work at CENTCOM.
The Daily Beast noted,
"The allegations echoed charges that political appointees and senior officials cherry-picked intelligence about Iraq’s supposed weapons program in 2002 and 2003."
Indeed, the some of the complaint’s specifics now provided, include
"that in some cases key elements of intelligence reports were removed, resulting in a document that didn’t accurately capture the analysts’ conclusions."
Analysts also described a work-climate
"in which analysts felt they could not give a candid assessment of the situation in Iraq and Syria. Some felt it was a product of commanders protecting their career advancement by putting the best spin on the war. Some reports crafted by the analysts that were too negative in their assessment of the war were sent back down the chain of command or not shared up the chain, several analysts said. Still others, feeling the climate around them, self-censored so [that] their reports affirmed already-held beliefs."
It is further reported, that some of those who complained about the situation were urged to retire, and some of them did so.